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DOES TECHNOLOGY REQUIRE NEW LAW?
•

DAVID FRIEDMAN

Technological change affects the law in at least three ways:
(1) by alteririg the cost of violating and enforcing existing legal
rules; (2) by altering the underlying facts that justify legal rules;
and (3) by changing the underlying facts implicitly assumed by
the law, making existing legal concepts and categories obsolete,
even meaningless. The legal system can choose to ignore such
changes. Alternatively, it may selectively alter its rules
legislatively or via judicial interpretation. In this essay I first
discuss, as an interesting historical example, past technological
changes relevant to copyright law and the law's response. I
then go on to describe the technological changes that are now
occurring or can be expected to occur over the next few
decades, the issues they raise for the legal system, and some
possible responses. I conclude with a brief discussion of the
degree to which such changes can be addressed under current
legal rules and the degree to which new rules may be required.
I.

COPYRIGHT:

THE TECHNOLOGIES

Prior to the copyright act of 1891, works by British authors
were unprotected in the United States. Despite the lack of
protection, British authors sometimes made more money from
sales in the United States than from sales in Britain. The reason
appears to have been that the printing technology of the time,
hand set 1lead type, provided a substantial first-mover
advantage. The authorized publisher, having paid his fixed
costs from sales during the period after the book had come out
* Professor of Law, Santa Gara University. This essay is a revised version of
remarks delivered at the Federalist Society Twentieth Annual Student Symposium
on "ls Technology Changing the Law?" at Boalt Hall School of Law, March 9-10,
2001.
1. "In fact, lead time was important enough that many English writers earned
more from the sale of advance proofs to American publishers (despite lack of
copyright protection in America) than from the copyright royalties on their
English sales." Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright
in Books. Photocopies. and Computer Programs, 84 HARv. 1. REv. 281, 300 (1970).
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but before a pirate copy could be set and printed, could, if
necessary, issue a lower priced "fighting edition" designed to
prevent the pirate from recovering his fixed cost, making
piracy unprofitable. This approach to rewarding writers
became ineffectual once technological changes made it possible
for a pirate to use photographic methods to free-ride on the
typesetting effort of the original publisher, bringing out an
unauthorized edition at a lower production cost immediately
after the authorized edition appeared.
Over the past few decades, improved means of copyingxerography, cassette tapes, VCR's, floppy disks, CDR's - have
made it easier to violate copyright law by copying protected
intellectual property (IP). Computer networks make it possible
to disseminate pirated IP in digital form anonymously,
impeding enforcement of copyright law. On the other hand,
Internet search engines make it possible to search for a single
text string in over a billion locations in a few seconds at
negligible cost, easing the detection of some forms of copyright
violation. Thus technological change has altered the cost both
of violating and of enforcing the law. In some casesindividual pirating of cassette tapes and computer software
and off-the-air recording of television programs are obvious
examples-technological advances have made pre-existing law
unenforceable. We have moved, in the space of a little over a
century, from technologies that made it possible to protect
writings even without copyright law to technologies that make
2
it impractical to protect programs even with copyright law.
Finally, consider the issue of whether computer programs
are "writings," and hence legally protectable by copyright. The
problem arose because computer programs were a new sort of
intellectual property, one that did not clearly fit any of the
2. More precisely, it is now impractical to use copyright law to protect
computer programs directly against copying by individual users. It can still be
used to prevent large-scale commercial piracy, although that may cease to be
practical if further progress produces the sort of strong privacy that makes
practical large-scale commercial activity online by anonymous actors. See David
Friedman, A World ofStrong Privacy: Promises and Perils ofEncryption, 13 SOC. PHIL.
& POL'y 212 (1996), available at http:j jwww.daviddfriedman.comj Academicj
Stron~Privacy jStron~Privacy.html. In addition, the expansion of copyright
implemented in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act may make it easier for
owners of intellectual property to protect it by non-legal mechanisms, such as
impeding the spread of devices for subverting technological protection. See 17
U.S.c. §§ 1201-1204 (Supp. 2000).
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relevant legal categories. Some courts argued that they were
3
writings. Others argued that at least some programs, such as
machine language programs burned into the ROM of a
computer, were not writings, because they were not intended
4
to be read by human beings. They were functional parts of a
machine-in John Hersey's memorable phrase, "elaborate
cams."s Courts taking the latter position even found a
precedent-a case ruling that player piano rolls, the functional
equivalent o.f .com~uter programs under an earlier technology,
were not wrItingS.

II.

COPYRIGHT:

THE LEGAL REsPONSE

When technological change affects legal rules, the legal
system can respond by trying to deal with the new technology
under existing rules, by creating new rules, or by modifying
old ones to fit the new technology. Again, copyright law
provides examples.
Courts that followed the precedent of White-Smith by holding
that machine language programs were not writings applied
existing rules by asking whether the new entity fit the
description of the relevant legal category. The answer was
obviously "no;" a machine language program burned into a
computer chip is not a writing in any ordinary sense of the
word.
Courts that came down on the opposite side of the
controversy, and the Congress that ultimately settled the
matter by revising the copyright code to explicitly cover

3. Strictly speaking, they were "literary works," the term used in the copyright
statutes that corresponds to the Constitution's "writings." See, e.g., Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983)
(arguing that a computer program is a literary work).
4. Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979)
(finding the object phase of a computer program not a qualifying copy under
either the Copyright Act of 1909 or common law because it is not intelligible to a
human reader). But see Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F.
Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (holding that software embedded in a ROM was
copyrightable).
5. The analogy to a "cam" was made by Copyright Commissioner (and author)
John Hersey in his dissenting opinion in THE FINAL REPoRT OF 1HE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHrED WORKS (1979),
available at http://home.nyu.edu/ -gmp216/ documents/ contu/ contu-finaIreport.
txt. Judge Flaum in Data Cash Systems described a machine language program on a
ROM as "a mechanical tool or a machine part." 480 F. Supp. at 1065.
6. White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
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7

software, can be seen as fitting new technology into old law in
a different way. They concluded that the purposes of the
copyright act could best be served if programs were defined as
writings-whether or not programs were writings in any
s
ordinary sense of the word. In effect, they replaced "writings"
in the relevant legislation and case law with "writings or
computer programs," generating a new set of legal rules for
software by piggybacking on an existing set of legal rules for
writings.
What about creating entirely new rules to fit new
technology? One recent example is the Digital Millennium
9
Copyright Act of 1998. Part of its justification was that easy
copying and communication, via computers and the Internet,
had made copyright protection for intellectual property in
digital form difficult, perhaps impossible. A promising
alternative was technological protection, using encryption to
build a virtual barbed wire fence around intellectual property
whose legal protection was impractical. 10
Virtual barbed wire might be vulnerable to digital wire
clippers. Creating programs to bypass technological protection
requires technical skills that few users of the protected material
possess, but the Internet makes it possible for those few to
produce the tools and then make them readily available to
everyone else. Congress responded to that problem with new
legislation designed to make the creation and distribution of
such tools more difficult. Earlier examples of new legal rules to
deal with new technologies for creating or copying intellectual

7. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3028 (1980).
8. This argument for the copyrightability of software is defended in DAVID
FRIEDMAN, LAW'S ORDER: AN ECONOMIC ACCOUNT 137-38 (2000).
9. 17 U.S.c. §§ 1201-1204 (Supp. 2000).
10. Intertrust Technologies refers to such a container as a "digibox," see Mark
Hall, Digital Rights Firm Intertrust Set For IPO, COMPUTERWORLD (Sept. 27, 1999), at
http:j jwww.computerworld.comjcwijstoryjO.1199.NAV47-74_Sf037107.00.
html, whereas IBM refers to it as a "cryptolope," see IBM, IBM Cryptolope
Technology-Executive Summary, at http:j /www-3.ibm.comjsoftwarejsecurityj
cryptolopejabout.htmI (last visited Dec. 29, 2001). Compare Julie Cohen, Copyright
and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 1089 (1998), available at
http:j jwww.law.berkeley.edujjournalsjbtljjarticlesj13_3jCohenjhtmIjreader.
htmI, with David Friedman, In Defense of Private Orderings: Comments on Julie
Cohen's "Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, "13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1151
(1998), available at http:j jwww.law.berkeley.edujjournalsjbtljjarticlesj13_3j
Friedmanjhtmlj reader.htmI
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property include the Plant Variety Protection Ac~ll the Mask
Works Act,12 and the Audio Home Recording Act. I
I began this essay by listing the different ways technology
affects the law. As we have just seen, the history of copyright
law over the past century provides examples of all of them.
Legal problems associated with such effects are likely to
become increasingly common as rapid technological
development continues over the next few decades. In the next
Part I describe three such developments and the legal problems
they raise in some detail, and briefly sketch several more. Two
of the three, human reproductive technology and cryonic
suspension, have already begun to raise new legal issues. The
third, artifidal intelligence, may eventually prove the most
difficult to reconcile with our legal system.
ID. LEGAL IssUES OF THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY
A.

Human Reproductive Technology

Throughout almost all of human history, the fact that a child
was born from the body of a particular woman was conclusive
proof that she was the child's mother. Paternity.! on the other
hand, was in most cases impossible to establish; it was a wise
child that knew his father. Until very recently, these facts were
reflected in the law by rules providing that the woman who
bore a child was his legal mother and her husband the child's
legal father, even if there was some evidence to suggest that he
was not the biological father. 15
11. Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 7 U.S.c.) (protecting sexually reproducing plants). Protection for
asexually reproducing plants is provided by 35 U.S.c. § 161 (1994).
12. 17U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1994).
13. 17 U.S.c. §§ 1001-1010 (1994). The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992
permits home recording and the sale of suitable equipment and compensates
music creators and copyright owners out of a royalty pool funded by a tax on
digital hardware and blank recording media. See id.
14. The exception would be the case where it was only possible for one man to
have had sexual access to the mother, a situation that some traditional cultures
attempted to assure, at least for high status women, with varying levels of success.
For an entertaining eighteenth century account of the practical difficulties, see
Matthew Prior, An English Padlock, in A COLLECTION OF ENGUSH POEMS 1660-1800,
at 213-14 (Ronald S. Crane ed., 1932).
15. "The parent and child relationship may be established as follows: (a)
Between a child and the natural mother, it may be established by proof of her
having given birth to the child. . . ." Cal. Fam. Code § 7610(a) (West 2001).
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These facts are no longer true. Reproduction using a host
mother implanted with an egg fertilized in vitro means that a
child can be born from an unrelated woman. Genetic testing
permits biological paternity to be established with a high
degree of confidence. Legal rules at the state level have begun
to change, by court decisions and by legislation, to reflect these
16
new facts.
Further technological progress is likely to raise additional
legal issues. Consider the parentage of a child produced by
17
cloning. As judged by the clone's nuclear DNA, the child's
parents are the parents of the donor whose cell was used to
produce the clone. As determined by the clone's mitochondrial
DNA, the mother is the woman who donated the egg into
which the donated cell's nucleus was implanted. Judged by the
traditional rule for motherhood, the mother is the woman in
whose uterus the fertilized ovum was incubated. Determined
Furthermore, "except as provided in § 7541, the child of a wife cohabiting with her
husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of
the marriage." Cal. Fam. Code § 7540 (West 2001). The California rule goes back to
at least 1919: "'The issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not
impotent, is indisputably presumed to be legitimate.'" Brian C. v. Ginger K., 92
Cal. Rptr. 2d 294, 298 n.2 (2000) (quoting Estate of McNamara, 181 Cal. 82, 91
(1919) (citation omitted». The rule goes back in the common law at least to Lord
Mansfield's Rule: "[I]t is a rule, founded in decency, morality and policy/ that [the
father or mother] shall not be permitted to say after marriage, that ... Lhis or her]
offspring is spurious." Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (1777).
16. "Notwithstanding § 7540, if the court finds that the conclusions of all the
experts, as disclosed by the evidence based on blood tests performed pursuant to
Chapter 2 (commencing with § 7550), are that the husband is not the father of the
child, the question of paternity of the husband shall be resolved accordingly." Cal.
Fam. Code § 7541(a) (West 2001). In addition:
[A]lthough the [Uniform Parentage] Act recognizes both genetic
consanguinity and giving birth as means of establishing a mother and
child relationship, when the two means do not coincide in one woman,
she who intended to procreate the child-that is, she who intended to
bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own-is
the natural mother under California law.
Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (describing a surrogacy case in
which the host mother, who did not provide the egg, attempted unsuccessfully to
assert parental rights).
In the case of In re Marriage of Moschella, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994), the surrogate conceived by artificial insemination in order to provide a
child for the sperm donor and his infertile wife. The court affirmed the lower
court's judgment establishing the natural father and surrogate mother as the
parents.Id. The court noted that "[g]enetic parenthood established by, blood tests
trumps a presumption based on the cohabitation of a married couple. ' Id. at 1225.
17. I am assuming replacement of the nucleus of a fertilized egg with a nucleus
taken from a cell of an adult. A different and easier form of cloning-splitting an
embryo at the stage where it is only a few cells to produce a set of identical
offspring-raises fewer new legal issues.
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by the plausible criterion of genetic relatedness, the parent is
the cell donor, who is almost twice as closely related to the
clone as an ordinary parent to its children, although not quite
as closely as one of a pair of identical twins to the other. IS
This is not the end of the story. Techniques currently exist,
and have been applied to mice if not to humans, that produce a
chimera (also known as a mosaic) - an individual who is,
genetically speaking, two people, with half his cells coming
from one fertilized ovum and half from another. Another
technique, so far only theoretical, could be used to produce a
child with four grandparents and no parents. Either might be
used by a homosexual couple to produce a child genetically
linked to both members of the couple. 19 Other future
possibilities include transplanting sections of chromosomes
from one cell to another or creating new genes and implanting
them in the cell that will become a child.
There are a variety of ways in which current law could be
modified to take account of such developments. Probably the
simplest would be to retain existing legal rules for children
produced using the traditional method while defining the
parent(s) of any child produced by non-traditional means as
the person or persons who intended to take parental
responsibility when the events that produced that child took
20
place. That rule would provide at least as much certainty as
current law does while resolving parenthood issues raised by a
considerable range of reproductive technologies. This approach
would also do as well as present law, perhaps even slightly
better, at matching children with the adults most likely to care
for them.

18. This assumes that the cell donor is not also the egg donor. If she is, then the
clone shares both her mitochondrial and nuclear DNA, as would her identical
twin sister.
19. LEE SILVER, REMAKING EDEN: How GENETIC ENGINEERING AND CLONING
WILL TRANSFORM 1HE AMERICAN FAMILY 199-222 (1998) (describing these
technologies and their implications).
20. This is the approach taken by the court in Calvert, 81 P.2d at 776, and then
followed by the court in In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th 1411 (1998).
As the situations that produce such cases become more common with the
increasing use of the technologies, perhaps the law will begin to require that
before a medically assisted conception may take place the responsible parties file a
conception certificate specifying the intended parents.

HeinOnline -- 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 77 2001-2002

78

Harvard Journal ofLaw & Public Policy

B.

[Vol. 25

Cryonic Suspension

One striking feature of the past century has been the
extraordinary rate of progress in medical technology. A
hundred years ago, all that a doctor could do for most illnesses
was predict-tell the patient whether he should ~lan to be back
at work in a few days or start making his will. I Today, most
serious contagious illnesses can be cured. Diseases such as
measles and the flu, once mass killers, are now little more than
nuisances, at least in developed countries.
Some killers, however, such as cancer, AIDS, and heart
disease, still remain. This raises an interesting possibility:
You are dying of a currently incurable disease. Being
a technological optimist, you expect that the cure will
be discovered sometime in the next decade or two.
Unfortunately, you can't wait that long.
Or perhaps you can. You make arrangements to
have your body frozen immediately after death, before
any substantial deterioration has occurred, with
precautions to minimize any damage done in the
22
process. In return for a suitable payment, the firm
that freezes you guarantees that it will store your body
safely and arrange for your revival and cure when
medical progress makes it possible.
The cure for what killed you may appear in a decade
or so, but it will probably take considerably longer to
cure the damage done by dying and being frozen. You
are in no hurry. If a cure never appears, all that you
have lost is money. Comparing the downside risk with
the upside gain, this looks like an attractive gamble, at
least if there is any significant chance of winning.
21. See generally LEWIS THOMAS, THE YOUNGEST SCIENCE: NOTES OF A
MEDICINE-WATCHER (1983) (describing medical practice at the beginning of the
twentieth century and the radical changes that followed the development of sulfa
drugs and antibiotics).
22. This is not a trivial problem. Ice crystals produced in the body by freezing
can be expected to do very substantial damage, which current techniques attempt
to minimize. For a general discussion of the subject of cryonic suspension, see
Ralph C. Merkle, Cryonics. at http://www.merkle.com/cryo (last visited Dec. 29,
2001). See also The Alcor Life Extension Foundation, What We Do: Cryo Transport
and the Alcor Life Extension Foundation. at http://www.alcor.org/01b.html (last
visited Dec. 29, 2001).
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This is not a purely imaginary scenario. There are currently
23
at least three companies in the United States in the business of
freezing and storing people, and a large number of people 24
have
made arrangements to be frozen when and if they die. Of
course, no one has been thawed and revived thus far, nor is
anyone likely to be anytime soon.
Cryonic suspension raises legal issues by changing an
underlying assumption implicit in present legal rules: that
someone is either dead or alive, and we can almost always
discover, with a high degree of confidence, which. To see some
of the problems that may result from this new technology, let
us extend our story a little further:
Under current law, you cannot be frozen until you
are legally dead. Since you are legally dead, your wife
is a widow and free to remarry; she does. Since you are
dead, your heir is free to inherit your fortune; he does.
A decade of increasingly rapid medical progress
passes. Just ten years to the day after your suspension,
a research team publishes some startling news. A dog
has been suspended, kept frozen for a year, and
revived, with no major damage. Although it is still too
early to start reviving humans, the writing is on the
wall. Alcor begins making a list of customers who died
of causes now curable, and your name is on the list.
Your wife's new husband and your heir jointly break
into Alcor's storage facility one night, steal your body,
and cremate it. When questioned, they explain that
they have strong religious objections to maintaining
the corpse of one dear to them in such an unnatural
state.
They are guilty of breaking and entering and of
vandalism. They owe tort damages to Alcor for
damage to its property. The one thing they cannot be
23. The Alcor Life Extension Foundation, Cryonics Institute, and American
Cryonics Society.
24. Reports estimate that 80 to 90 bodies are in suspension and about a
thousand individuals have signed up for future suspension. Sidney C. Schaer,
Cryonics in a Deep Freeze: Predictions from the Past That Haven't Come True. . . Yet,
NEWSDAY, Feb. 5, 1999, at A19.
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guilty of is murder, because the body they burned had
been dead for ten years.
As this story suggests, there are serious problems with
applying current law to a technology that makes it possible for
many people to spend an extended time in a state of "maybe
dead." The problem is not entirely novel-there is some
similarity to the situation of a patient in a coma or a missing
25
person mistakenly declared dead. But the former usually
involves only a brief period of time and the latter a mistake.
Cryonic suspension raises the possibility that large numbers of
people may be known to be in a state neither dead nor alivewith no bodily function, but a possibility of future revival. It is
difficult to see how the law can adequately adapt to such a
situation without a substantial innovation, perhaps the creation
of a new legal category to apply to such people.
The lack of a suitable category is not merely a problem for
dealing with people who26might destroy suspended bodies in
some hypothetical future. It is a problem today, and one that,
arguably, has lethal consequences. If revival is possible at all, it
is likely to be a good deal easier for someone frozen ten
minutes before he dies than for someone frozen ten minutes
after. Freezing someone ten minutes before he dies is, under
27
current law, murder.
C.

Artificial Intelligence

Computers do many of the same things that human beings
25. See, e.g., Martin v. Phillips, 514 So. 2d 338, 339 (Miss. 1987) (involving a man
who disappeared in 1969, was declared dead in 1976, reappeared in 1983, and
tried to reclaim property that his wife had inherited from him and sold); Cann v.
Cann, 632 A.2d 322, 324 (pa. Super. 1993) (adjudicating a similar issue in the
context of marriage law).
26. Even now, the problem is not entirely hypothetical. In 1987, there was an
extended legal conflict between Alcor and a local coroner who wished to autopsy
the head of Dora Kent, who had, according to Alcor's account, been suspended at
a point when she was clinically but not legally dead. Alcor succeeded in
preventing the autopsy. See Jennifer Warren, Investigation Closing in Case ofFrozen
Head, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 29, 1990, at A3.
27. Thomas Donaldson unsuccessfully petitioned a California court in 1992 for
the right to be suspended before legal death, in order that he could be frozen
before, rather than after, the growth of a brain tumor seriously damaged his brain.
Donaldson v. Lungren, 2 Cal. App. 4th 1614 (1992). See also Miles Corwin, Tumor
Victim Loses Bid to Freeze Head Before Death. L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 15, 1990, at A28;
Cynthia Gorney, Cryonics and Suicide: Avoiding 'the Slippery Slope,' WASH. POST,
May I, 1990, at D6.
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do: arithmetic, pattern recognition, logic. This raises the
intriguing possibility that, at some time in the future, there may
exist programmed computers that are the functional
equivalents of humans. More than fifty years ago, Alan Turing
proposed a simple intuitive test of personhood: have a human
being converse, via teletype, with a computer and another
human; if he cannot reliably tell which is which, the computer
•
28
IS a person.
No machine has yet passed a Turing test, and it is unlikely
that any will do so in the near future. Current estimates suggest
that the processing power of the most advanced computer is
still orders of magnitude less than that of the human brain. But
this situation is changing. The processing power of computers
9
doubles every year or two/ the power of the human brain
does not. Raymond Kurzweil, a computer pioneer and
entrepreneur, estimates that in about thirty years computers
3o
will reach human levels of intelligence.
Creating an intelligent computer is not merely a problem of
hardware; without software, the most advanced computer is
only an expensive paperweight. This raises an intriguing
question: is it possible for humans to design something as
intelligent as, or more intelligent than, ourselves?
The short answer is that, although it may not be possible to
design such a program, it may still be possible to create it. We
ourselves demonstrate this fact. If we are, as most biologists
believe, the product of Darwinian evolution, then we are
intelligent beings created without the intervention of any being
more intelligent than, or even as intelligent as, ourselves.
Processes analogous to evolution have been applied to the
28. A.M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, in COMPUTERS AND
THOUGHT 11 (Edward A. Feigenbaum & Julian Feldman eds., 1963).
29. Gordon Moore, an inventor of the integrated circuit and chairman of Intel,
noted in 1965 that the surface area of a transistor in an integrated circuit was being
reduced by about 50% every twelve months; he later lengthened the estimate to
twenty-four months. Various forms of this observation have circulated under the
name of "Moore's Law." Because doubling the number of transistors on a chip
both doubles the amount of processing it can do and increases its speed by getting
the transistors closer together, the implication is that the doubling time for
computing power is less than two years. See RAy KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF
SPIRITUAL MACHINES: WHEN COMPUTERS EXCEED HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 20-25
(1999).
30. Id. Much of this Part of the article is based on Kurzweil's work. Kurzweil is
the originator of, among other things, the Kurzweil reading machine for the blind
and the Kurzweil synthesizer.

HeinOnline -- 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 81 2001-2002

82

Harvard Journal ofLaw & Public Policy

[Vol. 25

. 0 f computer programs. 31 0 ne approach to creating
. an
creatIOn
intelligent computer, if we are unable to design one, is to let it
create itself.
A second possibility is to pirate our design from the most
readily available source: the human brain. As scanning
techniques improve, it should become possible to freeze and
scan a human brain,32 layer by layer, giving us a full structural
map at the level of the individual neuron. Combine that with
the information currently being generated by research on brain
function, and we have the possibility of emulating a generic
human being in software-creating a program modeled after
the structure of the human brain.
A still more intriguing possibility is copying a particular
human brain, complete with memory. Given a good enough
form of nondestructive scanning and sufficiently powerful
hardware, it should be possible to upload a human being,
copying the entire structure that makes up a particular person's
thoughts, personality, memory, and consciousness to a
computer.
It may be that all of this will turn out to be a fantasy. Moore's
Law may break down before we are able to build sufficiently
powerful computers; further research may demonstrate that
human consciousness requires some essential element that
cannot be duplicated by machinery, however complex. All we
can say is that, thus far, there is no reason to think so. Hence for
the purposes of this article I will assume that Kurzweil is
correct, that at some point during this century there will exist
programmed computers that are the functional equivalents of
humans.
Artificial intelligence (" A.L") undercuts fundamental legal
categories. Our law has been built on the assumption that all
real persons are human beings with the characteristics of
human beings. One of those characteristics is a well-defined
identity. A program, however, can be copied. Once there is one
human-level A.L program, as many identical copies can be
made as there is hardware available to run them. Which of
these is the original? Which is guilty for his crimes and torts,
31. Id. at 40-50.
32. Such a teclmique could first be applied to the brain of someone recently
dead, and later, when nondestructive teclmiques become available, to a living
brain.
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owns his property? The same problem arises for biological
humans if they can be uploaded. After I have been copied into
a computer, which version is really me: the one running on
carbon or the one(s) running on silicon?
A closely related problem arises when we consider what it
means for an A.I. to live or die. Suppose a human saves the A.I.
program to mass storage and then turns off the computer. Has
he just killed the A.I.? His defense is that he can always turn
the computer back on, reload the copy, and have the A.I. back
with, from its viewpoint, no time having passed. Does it
become murder if he fails to first save the program in its
current state, but has a backup of it as of a day earlier? What if
he saves it but never plans to reboot? If I upload myself by a
process that destroys the original, have I ended my life or
extended it?
One possible response to these problems is for the law to
close its eyes to the personhood of A.I. programs, interacting
with them only through biological persons. In the short run this
raises serious moral issues; it permits, for example, chattel
slavery. In the long run, if Kurzweil's projections are correct, it
becomes unworkable both because increasingly able A.I.'s will
be unwilling to put up with it and because the distinction
between biological people and A.I. people will become less and
less sharp. Humans will be doing some of their thinking in
silicon - and must do so if they are not to become obsolete with
the further progress of the hardware A.I. runs on. Some
programmed computers will in fact be uploaded humans, and
in some cases the biological human may no longer exist.
D. Et Multae Caetera

I have described in some detail three areas in which new
technology may require new law. There are many others.
Consider, for example:
A major constraint on wiretapping at present is its high cost,
mostly in law enforcement labor. The progress of speech- to33
text software promises to reduce that cost drastically, perhaps
by orders of magnitude. It soon will be (if it is not already)
practical for law enforcement to tap hundreds of thousand of
33. Commercial examples include Dragon Dictate, from Dragon Systems, Inc.,
and Naturally Speaking, from IBM Corp.
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phones simultaneously, with a computer listening to and
recording each call, notifying a human only if the message fits
the criteria it has been programmed to check. A law
enforcement agency might even argue that such taps do not
require warrants, that until a human being listens to the
recording the process is more analogous to a pen register than
to a wiretap. When a human being wishes to listen to one
recording out of a thousand, the fact that the computer
reported that this particular recording met its criteria can be
offered as evidence justifying a warrant. How will the courts
and the law respond?
Surveillance technology is becoming increasingly cheap and,
as computer pattern recognition, including facial recognition,
improves, increasingly effective as a law enforcement tool.
How will the law adapt to a world in which everything that
happens in public places (and perhaps much that happens in
nominally private places) can be almost instantly known and
the information rapidly searched?34
The combination of computer networking and encryption
makes possible a world of strong privacy where individuals
can choose to interact anonymously, maintaining a cyberspace
identity linked to a reputation while keeping strictly private the
35
link between their cyberspace and realspace identities. Such a
world raises a set of intriguing legal issues. How do you sue for
tort damages or enforce a contract when you have no idea what
the defendant's name is, what he looks like, or what continent
he lives on?36

IV.

DOES NEW TECHNOLOGY
REQUIRE NEW LAW?

I have described technological developments, past, current,
and prospective, that have had or will have significant
consequences for the law. There remains the question of
whether all of them can be dealt with under existing legal rules,
34. See DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TEOiNOLOGY FORCE Us
TO CHOOSE BE1WEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998) (discussing many of the
issues raised by surveillance technology).
35. See Friedman, supra note 2.
36. See David Friedman, Contracts in Cyberspace, at http://www.davidd
friedman.com/ Academic/ contracts_in_%20cyberspace/ contracts_in_cyberspace.
htm (May 4, 2000).
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properly understood, or whether at least some require legal
innovation by judges or legislatures.
If legal rules are defined in sufficient breadth, legal
innovation is never necessary. Most issues raised by new
reproductive technologies, for instance, could be resolved by a
single, non-novel, rule: define parentage in whatever way best
serves the interests of the child. Indeed, it is arguably possible
to resolve all legal issues by a single very broad rule: have
whatever legal rules maximize economic efficiency.3?
Such principles, however, are too broad to apply with
predictable results at a reasonable cost. Hence legal systems
employ significantly more specific statements of the law, such
as the traditional rules for defining parentage, and fall back on
general principles like efficiency only when such rules prove
insufficient for dealing with hard cases or when changed
circumstances require the development of new rules.
If what we mean by "new law" is "new legal rules at the
level of generality of the rules now used to decide cases," it is
clear that new technologies will at least sometimes require new
laws. Legal rules that assume the identity of host mother and
gene mother or take it for granted that paternity cannot be
reliably determined are no longer useful in a world in which
both assumptions are false-and the legal system has begun to
alter itself accordingly. Legal rules that assume that a brief
examination is sufficient to determine whether someone is alive
or dead and that the latter status is irreversible might produce
unfortunate results in the context of cryonic suspension. Rules
that consider as legal persons only human beings or
organizations of human beings and take it for granted that
persons have the characteristics associated with human beings
and human organizations will be wholly unsuited to a world of
advanced artificial intelligence, when and if that world arrives.
In these cases and many others, new technology requires new
law.

37. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 21-24 (discussing whether the rule, originally
proposed by Judge Richard Posner under the label of "wealth maximization," is
deSirable); see also id. at 297-308 (discussing whether the rule correctly describes
the common law).
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